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Last month, when the BBC brought the matter to light, Assistant Chief Constable Lynn Ratcliff was questioned about whether there had been any earlier chances to intervene and prevent Alan Greer’s misconduct. She responded, “At this point, and we will keep it under review, there is nothing to suggest that there have been any missed opportunities over the years.” Pressed further about the presence of warning signs, Ratcliff maintained, “At this stage, we’ve got no evidence to suggest that is the case…” Regarding vetting issues related to Greer, she acknowledged that the vetting procedures have significantly evolved since Greer’s recruitment. She confirmed that under today’s standards, Greer would not have passed the vetting process but refrained from providing further specifics, adding that officers now undergo annual integrity testing alongside regular re-vetting.
The BBC’s Disclosure investigation uncovered several past incidents involving Greer before and during his police career. In 2002, Strathclyde Police investigated him for making inappropriate phone calls to a woman in Glasgow, a case forwarded to the procurator fiscal but ultimately not pursued. Subsequently, in 2005, the Metropolitan Police issued Greer a formal police caution after similar inappropriate calls to a woman he knew in London. Despite this, Strathclyde Police accepted Greer into their force in 2009, fully aware of at least the formal caution recorded by the Metropolitan Police. Police Scotland has now confirmed that the vetting unit handling his application was aware of the 2005 caution, as it appears in Greer’s partial vetting records. However, it remains unclear whether the earlier 2002 offence was discussed during his recruitment or known to vetting personnel. Sources suggest the 2002 incident “would absolutely” have been discoverable in his records.
Concerns have been raised about procedural failures with regards to vetting Greer. According to Strathclyde Police’s 2006 Standard Operating Procedures, individuals with cautions or convictions that could undermine their integrity should not be recruited. A police insider told the BBC, “Two reported crimes related to women before he joined should have been raising all sorts of alarm bells. He was clearly a menace from the off and should never have been allowed near a uniform to abuse his position.” Craig Naylor, chief inspector of HM Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland (HMICS), who led a 2023 review into Police Scotland’s vetting, described the 2009 vetting system as less stringent than today’s but still sufficient to block Greer’s entry. He stated, “My view is that he should never have got in at that point, and my view is that in the intervening period, I’m surprised that something didn’t come up about that.” When asked if earlier vetting failures were missed chances to stop Greer joining the police, Naylor answered simply, “Yes.”
A confidential document titled “Operation Submarine,” prepared by the case’s senior investigating officer in June this year, was obtained by the BBC. It provides a “high level overview” of Greer’s extensive serious sexual offending and explicitly references the 2002 and 2005 investigations under the section on “Identified Criminality.” The report affirms that under present vetting protocols, Greer would not have passed recruitment clearance. Although this dossier was shared with the Scottish government and the Scottish Police Authority (SPA), details were not openly discussed during a SPA board meeting held the week after the story broke. Only the SPA chairman and chief executive were briefed on the matter, while other board members received limited information. The SPA explained that operational briefings are “not routinely shared” with all members, though some questions were posed about the impact on public confidence and changes in vetting regulations that would prevent individuals like Greer from joining the force today.
Further findings from the 2023 HMICS inquiry highlighted significant shortcomings within Police Scotland’s vetting processes. Notably, there had been no re-vetting of existing officers and staff following the force merger in 2013. Greer was among roughly 8,800 personnel who had not undergone re-vetting, representing over a third of Police Scotland’s workforce. An assessment of a sample of applications from the previous four years uncovered at least 29 instances where risks were incorrectly evaluated by vetting officers. HMICS issued 15 recommendations, urging urgent reviews of identified problem cases, the introduction of annual integrity tests, and routine re-vetting every decade. While eleven of these suggestions have been fully implemented, several remain in progress. Craig Naylor expressed concern about continuing delays, noting, “It is a concern…there are still people who are not vetted three years on [from the review].”
In reaction to recent high-profile vetting failures in England, Police Scotland undertook a “historic data wash” aimed at uncovering intelligence or allegations requiring further investigation. Led by the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) and the vetting unit, this review did not reveal any significant new information about Greer. Police Scotland confirmed that the data wash did not flag any concerns related to him. However, Naylor described this as another missed chance to identify Greer earlier. A police source criticized the process, asking, “So the data wash was useless then? How can they say there were no missed opportunities to spot Greer sooner? The question is, how many more Alan Greers have they missed?” Police Scotland reiterated that vetting procedures have evolved considerably since 2009 and stated, “Under current arrangements, Alan Greer’s application would not have progressed.”
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