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On the evening of March 4, 2018, a call to the duty officer at MI6 headquarters brought an unexpected and troubling revelation: one of their agents had been poisoned and was lying in a hospital bed. This shocking event concerning Sergei Skripal, who was targeted on UK soil, sent ripples of alarm throughout the British intelligence community and raised challenging questions about security and threat assessment.
Skripal’s background revealed he had been recruited by MI6 in the 1990s and was later caught by Russian authorities before being exchanged in a spy swap deal in 2010. Initially, the assessment of the risk to his safety after settling in the UK was considered low, largely because he had been pardoned. However, post-incident evaluations admitted this was an error. Skripal, identified as a “settled defector,” had expressed a clear preference not to adopt a new identity or life, which, in hindsight, might have left him vulnerable to the nerve agent attack. The report indicates that despite no clear signs warning of a nerve agent assault, regular and updated risk assessments were lacking.
By 2014, relations between Russia and the West had deteriorated significantly, especially in light of the Ukraine crisis. At the same time, Skripal’s contact with European intelligence agencies may have further heightened his profile as a target. The nerve agent Novichok used in the attack was intended as a striking demonstration of Russian state power. Many intelligence insiders believe the true intent was to send a message: betrayal of Russian secrets to Western agencies would not be tolerated, no matter how long it took or how much collateral damage was involved. The Russian military intelligence service, the GRU, which Skripal had formerly been part of, is seen as central to this operation. As a direct consequence of the attack, British intelligence enhanced protective measures around defectors and others considered at risk within the UK.
The investigation conclusively points to a unit of the GRU as responsible for carrying out the poisoning. The operatives entered the UK on a short mission, left behind the lethal Novichok-laced perfume bottle, and subsequently departed. Their identities were uncovered relatively quickly, and many GRU operations, along with their false identities, have since been exposed, notably by investigative groups like Bellingcat. Despite increased counterintelligence efforts, including widespread expulsion of Russian diplomats across Europe following events like the Salisbury attack and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, operations by Russian intelligence remain a concern. Russia has adapted by employing proxies—such as Bulgarian nationals in the UK—who are hired to conduct surveillance and other illicit activities, sometimes backed by Moscow. These groups, although often amateurish, still pose a threat, as noted by Roman Dobrokhotov, a Russian journalist living in exile who had been targeted by such operatives.
This shift in tactics points to a new model for Russian intelligence operations, relying on disposable agents for hire and even enlisting low-level British criminals for sabotage activities like arson. The nature of enforcement and countermeasures has evolved, requiring different policing strategies to identify and disrupt these covert activities compared to traditional spy-catching methods. Counter Terrorism Police report that their workload dealing with hostile state threats has increased fivefold since the Salisbury incident. While the likelihood of another nerve agent poisoning on UK soil may have declined due to heightened vigilance and stronger defenses, the ongoing low-level conflict involving surveillance, sabotage, and proxy operatives means that other forms of risk persist
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